Did UEFA's Financial Fair Play harm competition in European football leagues? by Birkhäuser, S. et al.
 
 
 
Did UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Harm 
Competition in European Football Leagues? 
 
 
Stephan Birkhäuser1, Christoph Kaserer2, and Daniel Urban3 
Abstract 
When introducing UEFA’s Financial Fair Play (FFP) it was argued that as a 
beneficial side effect competition in European football leagues should become 
more equilibrated and perceived as being fairer. Based on a hand-collected dataset 
on league results, player market values as well as investor payments of more than 
300 European football clubs, we scrutinize the impact of FFP on the competitive 
landscape in major European football leagues. By applying a fixed-effect panel 
regression difference-in-differences approach, we find results that are consistent 
with the view that FFP might have further amplified the competitive imbalance. 
This might be caused by the fact that FFP raises some barriers against the entrance 
of new investors. Moreover, we present evidence that FFP supports the former 
season’s winner in terms of budget shares in the upcoming season. Overall, our 
results support the view that FFP turns European football leagues less equilibrated 
and even tends to freeze current hierarchies. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the nineties increasing broadcasting and marketing revenues largely expanded the budgets of 
professional European football clubs, especially those of the most well-known. Moreover, foreign 
investors started to target several of these well-known clubs. With Roman Abramovich becoming owner 
of Chelsea F.C. in June 2003, investor presence at European football clubs has extensively been 
discussed among officials of the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), the media, and fans. 
Interestingly, during the same period the financial conditions of many European professional clubs 
considerably deteriorated. Franck (2014) reports that in 2011 European top division clubs accumulated 
net losses of 1.7bn Euro, a number three times as high as in 2007. Evidently, even though clubs’ revenues 
substantially increased since the nineties, their expenses, foremost transfer payments and player wages, 
did so to a larger extent. 
As a reaction to this seemingly unsustainable situation, the UEFA announced in 2010 a set of 
regulations, known as financial fair play (FFP), aimed – amongst others – at (i) introducing more 
discipline and rationality in the management of European football clubs, (ii) decreasing the pressure on 
salaries and transfer fees and (iii) protecting the long-term viability of European club football.1 The 
UEFA’s most important lever to achieve these goals was to make financial discipline a prerequisite of 
club licensing. Simply put, under FFP clubs must (almost) balance “relevant” income with “relevant” 
expenditures over a three-year period. Most importantly, these rules should prevent clubs from going on 
excessive shopping tours in- and outside Europe spending money generated through laxly granted loans 
or injected by financial or private investors. The first assessments under this rule were mandated in 
2011, and as of 2013 and 2015, respectively, clubs have to obey to even stricter rules (e.g., UEFA 2010, 
UEFA 2012, and UEFA 2015). For example, as of 2011, clubs need to prove that they do not have 
excessive payables towards all types of stakeholders and as of 2013, clubs also have to balance their 
relevant revenues and relevant expenses as well as their debt capital (“break-even requirements”). 
Ultimately, by forcing clubs’ management to act more responsibly, the UEFA wished to strengthen 
                                                            
1 The UEFA’s official goals of FFP are stated on http://www.uefa.org/protecting-the-game/club-licensing-and-
financial-fair-play/index.html. 
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market discipline – in terms of player wages and transfer payments – to improve the long-term 
sustainability of European club football. 
It should be noted, however, that right from the beginning FFP was also seen as instrument to level the 
playing field between a few well-known clubs that can easily tap investors’, banks’, or even taxpayers’ 
money, and the remaining clubs. By doing so, it was expected to make competition more equilibrated 
and perceived as being fairer. Both effects would be a prerequisite for maintaining fan engagement and 
public interest at a high level in European football, securing its long-term viability, according to the 
supporters of FFP. In fact, at the meeting of the UEFA’s executive committee in June 2015 the then 
General Secretary, Giovanni Infantino, highlighted the necessity of further ensuring the competitive 
balance of Europe’s football and the role FFP plays in this respect. Actually, FFP should be an 
instrument to “bring more clubs to compete at the top table”.2 
Nevertheless, the primary goal of FFP was to establish financial discipline and rationality in the 
management of European football clubs. The improvement of the competitive balance was rather seen 
as a beneficial collateral effect.3 While there is evidence that FFP was somehow successful in achieving 
its primary goal, in this paper we focus on giving new insights with respect to the second argument. 
Actually, we will scrutinize the impact FFP had on the degree of competition in several large European 
football leagues. For a broader review on the different implications of FFP, cf. e.g., D’Andrea & 
Masciandro (2016), Franck (2014), and Peeters & Szymanski (2014). In terms of competitive effects 
some critical voices have also been raised against FFP. The criticism mostly was based on the argument 
that by effectively limiting new outside capital injections, the current hierarchy in the European football 
leagues will be frozen and future development is jeopardized (Vöpel 2011, Madden 2012, Sass 2012, 
Madden 2014, Preuss et al. 2014). 
However, to the best of our knowledge all the papers dealing with the potential competitive effects of 
FFP are theoretical, which is not surprising taking into account that the UEFA started introducing FFP 
                                                            
2 Cf. The Guardian, Monday 29 June 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/jun/29/uefa-financial-fair-
play-investors. In an official document the UEFA also says that by complying with FFP “more clubs can be 
credible long-term investment prospects”; cf. http://www.uefa.com/community/news/newsid=2064391.html. 
3 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this important aspect. From the perspective of the UEFA, the 
establishment of financial discipline was the major reason for introducing FFP. 
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more strictly only in 2013. Therefore, this paper aims to contribute to this debate by presenting a first 
empirical analysis of the potential effects of FFP on competition in the major European football leagues.  
To this end, we hand-collect a novel dataset that covers league results, player market values as well as 
investor payments to more than 300 football clubs in the first and second football leagues in five 
European countries (England, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain) throughout the 2004/2005 to 
2014/2015 seasons. In our setting, investor payments are defined as payments of either a high-profile 
natural person or legal entity that holds a significant share of the club’s capital as well as payments of 
all other high-profile natural persons or legal entities with no shareholdings in the club and no direct or 
indirect relationship to a sponsor of the club, credit or public sector institution. 
Based on this dataset, we find three main results. First, contrary to what has been claimed by the 
supporters of FFP, we find evidence supporting the view that FFP has further increased the competitive 
imbalance in European football leagues, as measured by the distribution of game points. Second, it 
seems that an important driver of this result rests on the finding that a larger number of investors makes 
a league more equilibrated, because, similar to venture capital, investors might break up established 
structures and increase competition. FFP, however, tends to raise some barriers against the entrance of 
new investors. Two more results fit into this picture. We find evidence for FFP leading to an increase in 
the dispersion of player market values in each league. Also, we can show that positive correlations of 
investor presence and competition are less pronounced when FFP has been introduced. Third, we find 
evidence that, after FFP, the share of clubs that were successful in the former season is positively 
correlated to the overall transfer budgets of the upcoming season. To sum up, all our results are 
consistent with the view that FFP tends to make European football leagues less equilibrated and to freeze 
current hierarchies.  
An obvious limitation of our results are identification issues. In fact, taking into account that FFP was 
introduced only recently and for all clubs that qualified for a UEFA competition at the same time, it is 
difficult to disentangle the impact of FFP from other unobserved variables. We address this issue by 
using panel regressions accounting for league, club and season fixed effects. In this way we implicitly 
control for the impact coming from league specific developments (e.g. broadcasting revenues) as well 
as club specific behavior (e.g. transfer oriented vs. in-house young academies). Moreover, we also 
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account for time trends. In addition, we look at different model specifications and sample periods and 
find similar results. Furthermore, when we conduct a placebo test, we do not detect any effects. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that the impact of unobserved variables is not constant over time, 
identification deficiencies might still arise.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the relevant 
literature. In Section 3, we describe the data, while Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 summarizes 
the main findings and discusses some implications. 
2. Literature review and theoretical considerations 
League inequality has been an increasingly popular topic in sports science and economics. Goossens 
(2006) examines the competitive balance of eleven football leagues in Europe from the 1960s up to 2005 
to determine similarities between different nations, thus concluding whether common regulatory 
standards should be put in place by the UEFA. Goossens also discusses whether a pan-European league 
represents a remedy to increasing football league inequality as a result of a few dominant clubs. 
Furthermore, Bloching & Pawlowski (2013) analyze the trends in competitive balance throughout 
Europe’s top five football leagues from 1991 to 2011. They argue that the top leagues in Germany and 
France are likely to be the most exciting ones even though there is decreasing competition throughout 
all the football leagues in the sample. They further hypothesize that high Champions League payouts 
might also foster this development. 
The presence of football investors has also been widely discussed in academic research. Based on seven 
case studies, Hassan & Hamil (2013) focus their analysis on the implications of different management 
styles of football clubs. For example, they discuss recent developments such as the increasing 
commercialization and the growing presence of foreign third-party owners of English football clubs. 
Fort & Quirk (2004) differentiate between leagues composed of owners who wish to maximize the 
percentage of wins (e.g., lower tier European football leagues) versus those with clubs that wish to 
maximize profits (e.g., the Premier League). Based on a theoretical model, they argue that the level of 
competitive balance does not differ in both types of leagues. In addition, Pawlowski (2013) conducts a 
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survey among 1,700 football fans in Central Europe and finds that the majority of fans think that 
investors reduce the audience’s excitement for the sport.  
In addition, a large literature examines implications of the UEFA FFP regulation on competition. For 
example, Franck (2014) argues that the three major criticisms of FFP – benefits from substantial 
injections of “external” money into payrolls (Madden 2014), reductions in competition in the player 
market without achieving benefits from more balanced competition (Peeters & Szymanski 2014), and, 
due to market entry barriers, freezing the current hierarchy of clubs – are essentially unfounded. Franck 
also suggests that FFP can even increase competition as it reduces conspicuous payments to successful 
clubs in case of investors who wish to bet on winning teams. D’Andrea & Masciandro (2016), in turn, 
reexamine these three critiques and provide some continuative views. 
This far, however, there is no empirical study that combines data on investor cash flows to European 
football clubs irrespective of the investor’s ownership status in the club and data on football league 
inequality and that investigates the effects of FFP. In doing so, we are able to provide empirical evidence 
on the simultaneous effects of investor presence and UEFA regulations on competition. 
In essence, we argue that the introduction of FFP hardened football clubs’ budget constraints. 
Beforehand, soft budget constraints let firms overspend, because, similar to too-big-too-fail banks, there 
have hardly been credible threats of dissolution or insolvency, which led clubs to operate under “soft 
budget constraints” (Franck 2014). In this regard, FFP was supposed to end the “zombie race” as a result 
of irresponsible spending of football clubs. Under the new regime, if UEFA strictly enforces its new 
financial fair play regulation, violation may result in fines, point deductions, and even in the exclusion 
or disqualification from competitions.  
Therefore, managers and investors may turn more risk-averse, foregoing investments into new players, 
which could then disrupt the status quo. In a way, FFP penalizes smaller clubs, because in contrast to 
spending limits on salaries of North American football or basketball players, which are the same for all 
teams, FFP defines club-specific limits (e.g., Peeters & Szymanski 2014). Ultimately, we thus posit that 
FFP will result in an ossification of established hierarchies in football leagues since it reduces smaller 
clubs’ external financing opportunities. For example, could have Manchester F.C. become this 
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successful under the current financial fair play regulation and disrupted the ordering of top clubs in the 
Premier League? 
3. Recent developments in European football leagues 
During the 1990s, the first European football leagues had been generating annual revenues of about 
several hundred million Euros. At the turn of the millennium, however, major changes such as increasing 
investor presence, internationalization and changes in consumer behavior affected the core business 
model, which resulted in an extraordinary growth in sales in the football industry. Over the last years, 
the Premier League was able to position itself as a market leader in terms of the revenues of its clubs 
(Figure 1). While total sales for the first leagues in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain amounted to about 
1,250 to 2,000m€ during the 2012/2013 season, the Premier League realized sales of almost 3,000m€. 
Figure 1: Revenues in major football leagues in Europe (Source: Soriano, 2014). 
This dominance is likely to pertain, merely due to considerable imbalances in the commercialization of 
television rights across the major European football leagues, particularly due to the latest, record-
breaking television rights contract signed for the Premier League in 2015.  The high amount of sales can 
at least partly be explained by the dominance of the Big Four clubs (Chelsea F.C., Manchester United 
F.C., Arsenal F.C. and Liverpool F.C.) in the mid-2000s and the rising success of their pursuers, 
Manchester City F.C. and Tottenham Hotspur F.C. since 2009. Thereby, the Premier League more likely 
could offer more top-class matches than any other national competition in European football, leading to 
increasing offers for television rights by the competing media giants BT and Sky.  
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Besides revenues from broadcasting, game day revenues from ticket sales and advertising revenues from 
sponsors as well as merchandising deals constitute the three most important sources of revenues for 
football clubs (e.g., Teichmann, 2007).  
Recently, UEFA prize money has also become an important source of revenue for football clubs. Figure 
2 shows that, on average, UEFA payouts to the clubs competing in the Champions League and Europa 
League have doubled throughout the last decade. Thereby, more and more clubs feel obliged to qualify 
for these two European tournaments as failure leads to a drop in prize money, fewer merchandising 
sales, and deterioration in the value of the club brand. Declining UEFA prize money may even force 
clubs to cut budgets and sell players. The increasing importance of international football tournaments 
might thus be likely to split football clubs into two segments: major clubs with strong international 
brands and local or regional clubs forced to focus on their regional identity. 
Figure 2: UEFA prize money paid to major European football leagues (Source: Own calculation 
based in prize money awarded by the UEFA). 
The increasing importance of international success is also accompanied by higher expenditures for 
players (Figure 3). Throughout the last decade, player market values increased by about 100%. This 
effect is consistent across all major European football nationalities. Not surprisingly, player market 
values are highest in the first two English football leagues. It is likely that external financing by investors 
such as Roman Abramovich (Chelsea F.C.) and Sheikh Mansour (Manchester City F.C.) may have 
amplified the development of higher player market values and thereby increasing costs to English 
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football clubs. For example, Manchester City F.C. received investor payments of about 1,300m€ during 
the sample period. In the following sections, we thus shed new light on the presence of investors in 
major European football leagues and their implications on competition in national football leagues.  
Figure 3: Player market values in major European football leagues (Source: Own calculation based 
on data by www.tm.de). 
However, despite increasing revenues and player market values, many football clubs have recently 
struggled financially. For instance, aggregate losses reported by top-division clubs in Europe increased 
from 600m€ in 2007 to 1.7b€ in 2011 (UEFA 2013). Furthermore, at that time, 38% of clubs had 
negative equity, i.e., debt exceeded total assets (UEFA 2013). Thus, to improve the financial stability of 
European football clubs, the UEFA has legislated FFP. In the following we will examine the effects of 
the FFP regulation on football league competition.  
4. Data 
In this paper, we compile a representative dataset that covers 305 individual football clubs across the 
first and second leagues in five European countries throughout the 2004/2005 to 2014/2015 seasons. 
The countries in the sample are England, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. As the sample period 
extends to more than a full decade, we carefully check for clubs that advanced from lower to higher 
leagues and vice versa. 
In the remainder of this section, we provide some evidence on competition in European football leagues 
based on several measures of competitive balance. Furthermore, we describe how we measure investor 
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payments to European football clubs. Finally, we also explain several control variables used in 
regression specifications to mitigate concerns about omitted-variables bias.     
Competition in European football leagues 
Previous literature has established a wide range of other measures of competitive balance.4 In this study, 
we examine both long-term and short-term aspects of competitive balance. The first measure, the so-
called Theil index, analyses betting odds for individual matches to compare the uncertainty of the match 
outcome (home victory, draw, or away victory). The other two measures capture league inequality on a 
long-term basis. The Herfindahl-index of competitive balance (HICB) and the C5 index of competitive 
balance (C5ICB) refer to the distribution of final points of all competing teams (HICB) or the share of 
the five most successful ones (C5ICB) in a given season. Besides the two time dimensions, two different 
data sets - betting odds and final points - enable us to draw robust conclusions irrespective of the measure 
for the level of competition. Other potential measures of competitive balance are, for example, the 
competitive balance ratio by Humphreys (2002), which is based on team and league results, or medium-
term measures such as the UCS measure by Janssens & Késenne (1987), which reflects for a given 
match day, the number of points a team needs to score so that it wins the championship. However, as 
Bloching & Pawlowski show for a recent time period, all the above measures of competitive balance 
yield relatively similar results. Therefore, we assume that by relying on both long- and short-term 
measures based on league results and betting odds, our results do not only apply to a single measure of 
competitive balance. 
The Theil index, originally developed by Theil (1967), is based on betting odds. Betting odds comprise 
all historic and current information regarding the possible outcome of a match such as the players’ 
conditions, injuries, or home field advantage. Thus, according to Pope & Peel (1989), betting odds 
represent an efficient measure for the uncertainty and therefore for the short-term competitive balance 
of a football league. In line with Czarnitzki & Stadtmann (2002), the Theil index can be calculated as   
Theil	index ൌ ∑ ୮౟∑ ୮౟య౟సభ log	ሺ
∑ ୮౟య౟సభ
୮౟
ଷ୧ୀଵ ሻ,     (1) 
                                                            
4 Bloching & Pawlowski (2013) provide an extensive overview of existent measures of competitive balance. 
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where ݌௜ refers to the probabilities of the three possible outcomes of each match (win, loss, draw). The 
arithmetic mean of all Theil indexes over all the matches in a given season results in the Theil index for 
that season. The Theil index increases with a higher (a priori) uncertainty of the match outcome. Thus, 
the higher the Theil index, the more equal a given football league. To obtain the probabilities ݌ for the 
different match outcomes, we calculate the inverse of the (decimal) betting odds retrieved for 3,000 
matches from www.football-data.co.uk. In doing so, we also take the margins of the bookmakers into 
account. 
The Herfindahl-index of competitive balance (HICB) is a modified version of the Herfindahl 
(Hirschman) index. The original Herfindahl (Hirschman) index (HI or HHI) is a statistical concentration 
measure (Hirschman, 1964). The HI of competitive balance (HICB) compares the proportion of the 
observed HI to the HI of a perfectly balanced league and is measured, according to Depken (1999) and 
Michie and Oughton (2004) as  
HICB୲ ൌ ∑ ௦೔,೟
మ೔ొసభ
ଵ/ே೟ ∗ 100,             (2) 
where ݏ௜,௧ denotes the share of points of team ݅ at the end of season ݐ, and ௧ܰ the total number of clubs 
in a league. As the HICB decreases with a higher level of competitive balance, we employ the negative 
HICB so that the Theil index and HICB are positively correlated. 
Finally, we calculate the five-club concentration ratio (C5), which relates the points of the best five clubs 
in a given season to the points scored by all clubs in that season. We further adjust the five-club 
concentration ratio by differences in league size ሺ ௧ܰ) to arrive at the C5 index of competitive balance 
(C5ICB), defined by Michie and Oughton (2004): 
C5ICB୲ ൌ ∑ ୱ౟,౪
ఱ౟సభఱ
ొ౪
∗ 100, (3) 
where ݏ௜,௧ denotes the shares of points of team ݅ relative to the league as a whole. 
Similarly to the HICB, the C5ICB decreases with a higher level of competitive balance. Thus, we also 
use the negative C5ICB to measure football league inequality. 
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Figure 4: Theil index for the highest European football leagues (Source: Own calculation). 
The developments of the three competition measures over time are displayed in Figures 4 to 7. In line 
with recent evidence by Bloching & Pawlowski (2013), we find that competition has on average 
decreased throughout the sample period. For example, the average share of points of the five best clubs 
(not normalized by league size) across all the first leagues increased from about 0.35 (2004/2005) to 
about 0.38 (2013/2014) or by about 9% (Figure 7), which corresponds to a decrease in the average 
negative C5ICB from -136 to -148 (Figure 6). Similar conclusions can be drawn based on the other two 
competition measures. Thus, it could be that the decrease in competition stems from investor presence 
as most of the investors’ money was paid to clubs in the first leagues. In the next section, we examine 
this relation more formally. 
Furthermore, the first French football league (Ligue 1) is generally the most balanced one. Compared to 
the other European football leagues, competition is modest in the German Bundesliga. Finally, 
competition is lowest in the English Premier League and the Spanish Primera División. 
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Figure 5: Negative HICB for the highest European football leagues (Source: Own calculation). 
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Figure 6: Negative C5ICB for the highest European football leagues (Source: Own calculation). 
 
 
Figure 7: Share of points of the five best clubs across the five first European football leagues in the 
sample (Source: Own calculation). 
Investor presence in European football leagues 
To measure the interplay of financial fair play, investor presence in European football leagues, and 
competition, we need to define the term investor payments. Investor payments are payments made either 
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high-profile natural persons or legal entities with no shareholdings in the club and no direct or indirect 
relationship to a sponsor of the club, credit or public sector institution. Investments made by these types 
of organizations are excluded intentionally because traditional sources of football club financing such 
as state-level subsidies, bank loans, or sponsorship payments are typically not regarded as investor 
payments. In a sense, we want to capture payments that potentially reflect a shock to the status quo, 
which are either driven by “sugar daddies” or other shareholders. Thus, only sponsorship payments by 
direct shareholders (e.g., Adidas AG, Allianz SE, and Audi AG at FC Bayern München) as well as 
sponsoring payments with unusual conditions in case they can be linked indirectly to a club’s 
shareholder (Manchester City F.C., Paris Saint-Germain F.C.) are considered. We further exclude 
investments from anonymous or small investors (e.g., small loans by fans). In our setting, investor 
payments are mostly either loans by external parties, donations, or the investor’s share in 
recapitalizations. In addition, we include purchases of equity stakes that have previously been owned by 
the football club itself. An overview of all investor payments can be found in Appendix A. 
Unfortunately, information on investor payments to football clubs is not readily available, particularly 
due to low or non-existent disclosure requirements. Nevertheless, we extensively screen financial 
reports, press releases as well as newspaper articles (in the original language versions) to obtain data on 
investors, their ties to the clubs as well as their payments. In this regard, we benefit from the high 
significance of football in the media and among fans as there are many articles on investor presence as 
well as their (oftentimes suspected) payments to football clubs. When there is no official information on 
investor transactions available, we validate the data based on different sources. 
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Figure 8: Investor payments to football clubs in major European leagues (Source: Own calculation). 
Figure 8 depicts the sum of investor payments to football clubs from major European leagues. As can 
be seen in the figure, investor payments have become more important throughout the sample period, in 
particular outside England. While investor payments amounted to about 132m€ in 2004/2005 with the 
bulk of it being paid to English football clubs, they amounted to more than 1,029m€ in the 2014/2015 
season with about equal parts going to English and German clubs. This trend is likely to continue as the 
UEFA has changed its financial fair play regulation so that football clubs may now attract investors 
more easily. Not surprisingly, 94% of the payments are made to clubs from the first league, potentially 
because these clubs appear more interesting to investors, for example because the brand of the club is 
more renowned. Finally, due to the so-called “50+1” rule, German clubs usually must not be controlled 
by third parties and hence, have been less attractive to investors in the past. 
Other variables 
Besides measures of competition, we employ the following variables measured at the club-level. Player 
market values is the average of all players’ market values (in m€) of a given club in a given season. To 
calculate this variable, we obtain data for more than 60,000 players from www.tm.de, a website that 
provides extensive information on football clubs as well as their squads.5 On this webpage, player 
market values are estimated by experts and long-standing users. In doing so, www.tm.de arrives at 
                                                            
5 The English equivalent is www.transfermarkt.co.uk.  
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relatively precise estimates of a player’s market value.6 In case there are missing market values for a 
given player in a given season, we set missing player market values to the lowest available player market 
value that is available for that club. To measure individual club performance, we rely on Points per 
match and Prob(win). Points per match is the average number of points scored in a given season. 
Prob(win) is a team’s share of wins in a given season. UEFA prize money, taken from official UEFA 
press releases, is the amount of money (in m€) a club is awarded due to its participation and success in 
international tournaments. Squad size and Squad age, obtained from www.tm.de, are the number and 
the average age of all players in a given squad and season. Top4 league is a dummy variable which is 
set to one if a league’s underlying national team was among the four best teams at the preceding world 
or European championships, and zero otherwise. First league is dummy variable which is set to one if 
the respective league is the first league in a given country, and zero otherwise. Finally, we measure 
absolute values of cash outflows (Transfer payments) and cash inflows (Transfer income) due to player 
transfers relative to lagged market values of a club’s players. Again the data is obtained from 
www.tm.de. 
In addition, we employ several variables measured at the league-level. The financial fair play (FFP) 
dummy is an indicator variable, which is set to one after 2013 and zero otherwise.7 The variable is 
supposed to capture implications of the introduction of the FFP regulation. Market value heterogeneity 
is the standard deviation of the clubs’ average player market values in a given league and season (in 
m€). Positive cash inflow denotes the fraction of clubs with at least one investor with an overall positive 
cash contribution to the club.  
Finally, we also add a set of season dummies to all regression specifications to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity over time. In league-level (club-level) regressions, we also add league fixed (club) effects. 
In doing so, we can control for all time-invariant effects at the league- or club-levels, respectively. 
                                                            
6 Gerhard, Mutz and Wagner (2014), for instance, show based on a sample 563 transfers during the 2012/2013 
season that the correlation coefficient between player market values and actual transfer fees was 0.93. 
7 In the license season 2013/14, for example, the „monitoring period” covers the reporting periods ending in 2012 
and 2013, respectively (cf. Franck 2014).  
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5. FFP and competition in European football leagues 
Investor presence and club competition 
First, we examine whether investor presence increases competition in national football leagues. To this 
end, we regress the three measures of competition on two measures of investor presence. On the one 
hand, we rely on Positive cash inflow, which denotes the fraction of clubs with at least one investor with 
an overall positive cash contribution to the club. On the other hand, we employ Cash flow heterogeneity, 
defined as the standard deviation of investor cash flows in a given league and season (in m€). To control 
for unobserved heterogeneity, we add league and season fixed effects. 
The results can be found in Table 1. Overall, we find a positive relation between the two measures of 
investor presence and competition. In two of the six models, the relation is also highly significant, even 
though we only look at within-league variation as we control for league fixed effects. The results are 
consistent with the view that investors can break up established structures and thereby increase 
competition. In addition to that, we also observe a strong negative relation between player market values 
and competition. 
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 (Ia) (Ib) (Ic) (IIa) (IIb) (IIc) 
Dep. variable Theil index HICB C5ICB Theil index HICB C5ICB 
Top4 league 0.340 0.0612 0.621 0.399 0.223 1.104 
 (0.546) (0.953) (2.111) (0.528) (0.858) (1.996) 
Market value heterogeneity   -1.980*** -1.529** -4.309*** -1.823*** -1.110* -2.947 
 (0.495) (0.500) (1.106) (0.542) (0.599) (1.681) 
Positive cash inflow 2.883 8.138** 22.10***    
 (1.819) (2.620) (6.596)    
Cash flow heterogeneity    0.00205 0.0113 -0.0228 
    (0.00628) (0.0125) (0.0498) 
Season fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
League fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 90 90 90 90 90 90 
R² 0.913 0.709 0.685 0.910 0.683 0.660 
Table 1: The dependent variables are different measures for the level of competition in major European football leagues (Section 4). One observation corresponds 
to one league in a given year. First League is a dummy set to one for the highest football leagues and zero otherwise. Top4 league is a dummy variable which is 
set to one if a league’s underlying national team was among the four best teams at the preceding world or European championships, and zero otherwise. Market 
value heterogeneity is the standard deviation of the clubs’ average player market values in a given league and season (in m€). Positive cash inflow denotes the 
fraction of clubs with at least one investor with an overall positive cash contribution to the club. Cash flow heterogeneity is the standard deviation of investor cash 
flows in a given league and season (in m€). Huber/White robust standard errors clustered by football league are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-levels, respectively. 
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Financial fair play and club competition 
In this section, we examine the determinants of club competition in European football leagues. To this 
end, we regress the three measures of league inequality on an interaction of the First League indicator 
and the financial fair play (FFP) indicator, which is set to one after 2013 and zero otherwise. We also 
add a set of control variables and league and season fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity at the league-level. Standard errors are clustered by football league.  
The rationale behind the interaction of the First League and FFP indicators is to come up with a 
differences-in-differences setting, where first leagues, in which participation in international 
tournaments is much more likely than in second leagues, are the treatment group. Therefore, second 
leagues are the control group. The period before the introduction of the FFP regulation is the pre-
treatment period, while the period after FFP has been introduced is the post-treatment period. Thus, the 
coefficient for the interaction between the treatment and the FFP indicators corresponds to the 
differences-in-differences effect.  
When performing a differences-in-differences analysis, it is important to ensure that the parallel trends 
assumption holds (e.g., Roberts & Whited 2012). To this end, we perform a graphical analysis of the 
development of the three measures of competition over time. The results can be found in Figures 9 to 
11. As can be seen by looking at the figures, the level of competition remains relatively flat until 2012 
both in major European first and second leagues, respectively. However, beginning in 2012, when FFP 
regulation was put into mandate, competition dropped significantly in 2012 in the treatment group, i.e., 
the first leagues, while it remained virtually unchanged in the second leagues. From the figures, it is also 
interesting to see that competition is generally lower in the first European football leagues. When 
performing differences-in-differences analysis, this pattern does not harm econometric analysis, as the 
differences-in-differences estimator accounts for this. Thus, from the graphical analysis in Figures 11 to 
13, we conclude that the parallel trends assumption is not violated and that the differences-in-differences 
estimates represents a viable methodology to estimate the effects of the FFP regulation on competition. 
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Figure 9: Theil index for European football leagues (Source: Own calculation). 
The results can be found in Models I in Table 2. The table is restricted to observations after 2009 to 
arrive at a symmetric time window around the introduction of FFP. We observe that player market value 
heterogeneity is negatively related to competition: The more unequal the player market values of a 
league’s clubs, the less suspenseful a league will be, both in the short-run (Theil index) and long-run 
(HICB, C5ICB). In contrast, the presence of investors, approximated by Positive cash inflow, which 
denotes the fraction of clubs with at least one investor with an overall positive cash contribution to the 
club, is positively correlated to competition. Thus, similar to venture capital, investors may break up 
established structures and increase competition. 
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Figure 10: Negative HICB for European football leagues (Source: Own calculation). 
 
Figure 11: Negative C5ICB for European football leagues (Source: Own calculation). 
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 (Ia) (Ib) (Ic) (IIa) (IIb) (IIc) 
Dep. variable Theil index HICB C5ICB Theil index HICB C5ICB 
Top4 league 0.617 0.258 -1.072 1.162 1.338 2.107 
 (0.719) (1.193) (2.947) (0.768) (0.973) (2.542) 
Market value heterogeneity   -0.794 -0.437 -0.941 -0.616 -0.112 -0.581 
 (0.507) (0.929) (1.896) (0.686) (1.219) (2.705) 
Positive cash inflow -0.374 13.30** 36.29** -2.395 9.306 24.67 
 (1.962) (4.620) (12.64) (2.472) (5.317) (15.12) 
First League * FFP -1.435* -2.866* -9.003*    
 (0.714) (1.286) (4.049)    
First League * FFP (2012)    -1.479* -2.887* -7.630* 
    (0.770) (1.415) (3.866) 
Season fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
League fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 
R² 0.968 0.780 0.736 0.968 0.778 0.720 
Table 2: The dependent variables are different measures for the level of competition in major European football leagues (Section 4). One observation corresponds 
to one league in a given year. The table is restricted to observations after 2009. The financial fair play (FFP) dummy is an indicator variable, which is set to one 
after 2013 and zero otherwise. Alternatively, we also set the variable to one after 2012 only (Models II). First League is a dummy set to one for the highest football 
leagues and zero otherwise. Top4 league is a dummy variable which is set to one if a league’s underlying national team was among the four best teams at the 
preceding world or European championships, and zero otherwise. Market value heterogeneity is the standard deviation of the clubs’ average player market values 
in a given league and season (in m€). Positive cash inflow denotes the fraction of clubs with at least one investor with an overall positive cash contribution to the 
club. Huber/White robust standard errors clustered by football league are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-
levels, respectively. 
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 (I) (IIa) (IIb) (IIIa) (IIIb) (IVa) (IVb) 
Dep. variable HICB HICB HICB HICB HICB HICB HICB 
Positive cash inflow  13.48** 13.33** 10.54*** 13.85*** 12.31*  
  (4.271) (4.722) (2.905) (3.914) (5.546)  
Cash flow heterogeneity       0.0484* 
       (0.0221) 
First League * FFP (2013) -2.385* -2.816** -2.870*     
 (1.088) (1.228) (1.302)     
Foreign test games  0.768      
  (6.408)      
SD(Foreign test games)   -0.0559     
   (0.960)     
First League * Placebo    0.123 -0.665   
    (1.329) (2.192)   
Positive cash inflow * FFP       -1.680  
      (2.216)  
Cash flow heterogeneity * FFP       -0.072* 
       (0.039) 
Season fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
League fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 110 50 50 60 50 50 50 
R² 0.687 0.780 0.780 0.718 0.727 0.742 0.743 
Table 3: The dependent variable is the HICB measure that captures competition in major European football leagues (Section 4). One observation corresponds to 
one league in a given year. In Models II and IV, the table is restricted to observations after 2009. In Model IIIa (IIIb), the sample is restricted to observations before 
2011 (2010). The financial fair play (FFP) dummy is an indicator variable, which is set to one after 2013 and zero otherwise. First League is a dummy set to one 
for the highest football leagues and zero otherwise. Top4 league is a dummy variable which is set to one if a league’s underlying national team was among the four 
best teams at the preceding world or European championships, and zero otherwise. Market value heterogeneity is the standard deviation of the clubs’ average 
player market values in a given league and season (in m€). Positive cash inflow denotes the fraction of clubs with at least one investor with an overall positive cash 
contribution to the club. Cash flow heterogeneity is the standard deviation of investor cash flows in a given league and season (in m€). Foreign test games reflects 
the share of football clubs in a given league and season that performed test games against teams from other countries. SD(Foreign test games) is the standard 
deviation of the number of test games against foreign teams before the start of the season, calculated per league and season. Models III perform placebo tests. The 
Placebo dummy is set to one after 2009 (2008) in Model IIIa (IIIb), and zero otherwise. Huber/White robust standard errors clustered by football league are 
presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-levels, respectively. 
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Most importantly, however, we find that the coefficient for the interaction of the FFP and the First 
League indicators are negative and statistically different from zero in two of the three models.8 When 
we replace the FFP indicator with another dummy variable that is already set to one after 2012 (i.e., 
after early effects of the financial fair play regulation became relevant) and zero otherwise, we obtain 
similar results (Models II). The result are thus consistent with the view that FFP has led to a reduction 
in competitive balance in European football leagues.9 
In Table 3, we examine the robustness of the results. First, we show that the results are robust to the 
exclusion of control variables as well as extending the sample period to all available years (Model I).10 
Moreover, in Appendix B we perform additional robustness tests based on other measures of competitive 
balance. Also, if we use the FFP (2012) dummy as an alternative starting point we get similar results 
(not reported). Second, in Models II, we additionally control for the fraction of football clubs that 
performed test games against foreign clubs before the start of the season (Foreign test games) and the 
standard deviation of the number of test games against foreign teams before the start of the season, 
calculated per league and season (SD(Foreign test games)). Data for these variables is manually 
collected from www.scorespro.com, a provider of extensive information on all types of football 
matches.11 These variables are supposed to capture the extent to which clubs can extract revenues from 
transnational popularity. Ultimately, these measures are supposed to control for the amount of money a 
club can generate in a world of globalized football markets because we expect that transnational fans 
(revenues) are positively correlated with test games against foreign opponents.12 In this way we control 
for unobserved heterogeneity which might drive our results. As the introduction of FFP went along with 
                                                            
8 Note that the model does not include the FFP and the First League dummies individually. This is because these 
variables are captured by the league and season fixed effects. 
9 It is not completely clear when FFP regulation became actually binding. We would argue that clubs could have 
expected that compliance with the rules was important in the 2013/2014 season. In February 2014, the UEFA 
announced that it would investigate the financial status of 76 clubs in more detail due to potential violation of the 
new regulation. These clubs had to provide the UEFA with additional financial information. Finally, in May 2014, 
the UEFA settled with nine of those clubs. In this regard, FC Zenit Saint Petersburg, Paris Saint-German F.C., and 
Manchester City F.C. agreed to pay 132m€ in fines (which may partly be returned after compliance with the rules), 
transfer spending restrictions, and salary caps. Therefore, UEFA FFP regulation is likely to have affected footballs 
clubs and competitive balance during the 2013/2014 season. 
10 In Appendix B, we perform additional robustness tests based on other measures of competitive balance. 
11 On average, across first and second leagues, we find that teams play against other clubs from 2.19 countries. 
64% of the teams play test games against foreign clubs. 
12 Ideally, one would like to obtain data on revenues or the size of the fan base. However, this data is not available 
for most clubs. 
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more intensive intercontinental marketing activities by European football clubs and, as a consequence, 
with increasing revenues from TV-rights and merchandising, it could well be, that this has created 
additional imbalances in the football leagues. However, our results are robust to the inclusion of these 
variables.13 
Third, in Models III, we perform placebo tests to show that our FFP dummies do not capture other 
underlying time trends. Therefore, in Model IIIa (IIIb), we restrict the sample to observations before 
2011 (2010), i.e., before the financial fair play treatment and set the placebo dummy to one after 2009 
(2008), and zero otherwise. Across all specifications, we do not observe a consistent pattern for the 
interactions of the placebo dummy and the first league indicator, suggesting that the results do not hold 
for other time windows. Overall, the evidence in Table 3 is thus in line with the view that FFP has 
reduced competition in European football leagues. 
In Models IV, we additionally test more directly whether the positive impact of investor payments on 
competition is reduced after the introduction of FFP. To this end, we interact two measures of investor 
presence with the FFP indicator. The two measures of investor presence are Positive cash inflow and 
Cash flow heterogeneity, defined as the standard deviation of investor cash flows in a given league and 
season (in m€). Across both models, we find that investor presence is still positively correlated with 
competition. This effect, however, is reduced after the introduction of FFP, as indicated be the negative 
interaction terms in all models.14 
We further examine another channel through which FFP reduces competition. Therefore, we regress 
player market value heterogeneity on the interacted First League and FFP indicators, respectively. The 
results can be found in Table 4. The table suggests that FFP leads to an increase in the dispersion of 
player market values in the first football leagues. The result is consistent with the view that FFP makes 
European football leagues even less equilibrated and tends to freeze current hierarchies. 
                                                            
13 The results are even stronger when we examine transcontinental instead of international friendlies only. 
14 The robustness of the results in Models IV is provided in Appendix C. 
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 (I) (II) 
Dep. variable Market value 
heterogeneity   
Market value 
heterogeneity   
Top4 league -0.00375 0.0256 
 (0.192) (0.210) 
Cash flow heterogeneity  -0.00592* 
  (0.00266) 
First League * FFP 0.517* 0.603** 
 (0.237) (0.250) 
Season fixed effects Yes Yes 
League fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 50 50 
R² 0.980 0.980 
Table 4: The dependent variable is the heterogeneity of player market values in a given league and 
season. It is defined as the standard deviation of the clubs’ average player market values in a given 
league and season (in m€). One observation corresponds to one league in a given year. The table is 
restricted to observations after 2009. The financial fair play (FFP) dummy is an indicator variable, which 
is set to one after 2012 and zero otherwise. First League is a dummy set to one for the highest football 
leagues and zero otherwise. Top4 league is a dummy variable which is set to one if a league’s underlying 
national team was among the four best teams at the preceding world or European championships, and 
zero otherwise. Cash flow heterogeneity is the standard deviation of investor cash flows in a given 
league and season (in m€). Huber/White robust standard errors clustered by football league are presented 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-levels, respectively.  
The freezing effect of FFP 
In this section, we show that FFP strengthens the link between past success in the league and player 
transfers in the upcoming season. Thereby, it ultimately freezes existent hierarchies and reduces 
competition. To this end, we regress absolute values of cash outflows due to player transfers relative to 
lagged market values of a club’s players on two proxies for a club’s success in the last season interacted 
with the FFP dummy. The two measures of past club success are the average points per match and the 
probability of a victory. In addition, we control for the average player market value per club, the size 
and the average age of the squad, cash inflows by player sales in the transfer market relative to the 
lagged market value of the squad, and the amount of UEFA prize money awarded in the previous season 
relative to the lagged market value of the squad. Results for club-level regressions can be found in Table 
5. The table is based on first league observations only. To control for unobserved heterogeneity, we now 
include club and season fixed effects. Besides relative transfer income, all independent club-level 
variables are lagged by one season. Standard errors are clustered at the club-level.  
We find that, relative to the market value of the squad, clubs with more valuable players and greater 
squads invest less money into new players. In contrast, teams with higher proceeds from player sales 
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invest more money in the purchase of new players. Interestingly, clubs that had been more successful in 
the past season also spend higher amounts of money on new players, as indicated by the positive and 
highly significant coefficients for points per match and probability of a victory. 
Most importantly, however, we observe positive coefficients for the interaction terms of past success 
and the FFP dummy. The coefficients are significant at the 5% level for the interaction based on the 
winning probability and they are close to conventional significance levels for the points per match 
variable. Thus, after the introduction of the FFP regulation, the link between past success and future 
spending on new players became stronger. Thereby, FPP benefits already successful clubs and makes it 
more difficult for less successful teams to spend more money on new players to improve the squad, 
which, in turn, results in lower competition.15 To sum up, all our results corroborate the criticism that 
FFP makes European football leagues even less equilibrated and tends to freeze current hierarchies. 
 (Ia) (Ib) (IIa) (IIb) 
Dep. variable Transfer 
payments 
Transfer 
payments 
Transfer 
payments 
Transfer 
payments 
Player market value -0.0443** -0.0505** -0.0428** -0.0480** 
 (0.0193) (0.0201) (0.0206) (0.0210) 
Squad size -0.00756** -0.00769** -0.00747** -0.00753** 
 (0.00324) (0.00327) (0.00331) (0.00331) 
Squad age -0.00600 -0.00213 -0.00613 -0.00214 
 (0.0142) (0.0139) (0.0141) (0.0137) 
Transfer income -0.0446 -0.0406 -0.0475 -0.0456 
 (0.119) (0.120) (0.120) (0.121) 
UEFA prize money   -0.124 -0.219 
   (0.200) (0.181) 
Points per match 0.0706*  0.0709*  
 (0.0412)  (0.0408)  
Points per match * FFP 0.110  0.110  
 (0.0689)  (0.0684)  
Prob(win)  0.460*  0.489** 
  (0.239)  (0.231) 
Prob(win) * FFP  0.433**  0.426** 
  (0.193)  (0.191) 
Season fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Club fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 482 482 482 482 
R-squared 0.624 0.627 0.624 0.628 
Table 5: The dependent variable is the absolute value of transfer payments of a given football club in a 
given league and year relative to the lagged market value of the squad. One observation corresponds to 
one value per club and season. The table is restricted to observations after 2009 and to first league 
observations only. The financial fair play (FFP) dummy is an indicator variable, which is set to one after 
2013 and zero otherwise. Points per match is the average number of points scored in a given season. 
                                                            
15 The results become stronger when one replaces the FFP dummy with the FFP (2012) dummy. 
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Prob(win) is a team’s share of wins in a given season. Player market value is the average of all players’ 
market values (in m€) of a given club in a given season. Squad size and Squad age are the number and 
the average age of all players in a given squad and season. Transfer income is cash inflows due to player 
transfers relative to the lagged market value of a club’s players. UEFA prize money, taken from official 
UEFA press releases, is the amount of money (in m€) a club is awarded due to its participation and 
success in international tournaments. All independent variables are lagged by one period. Huber/White 
robust standard errors clustered by club are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-levels, respectively. 
In Table 6, we show that the results are also robust to controlling for investor payments. For example, 
it could be that successful clubs retrieve more investor payments, which could spuriously result in more 
transfer cash outflows in those clubs. To mitigate this concern, we also control for contemporaneous 
investor payments to a given club in a given season. Not surprisingly, we observe that clubs that receive 
more investor payments spend more money on new players. Most importantly, however, we still find 
that the link between past success and future purchases of new players is stronger after the introduction 
of FFP, even after controlling for investor payments.  
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 (Ia) (Ib) (IIa) (IIb) 
Dep. variable Transfer 
payments 
Transfer 
payments 
Transfer 
payments 
Transfer 
payments 
Player market value -0.0460** -0.0521** -0.0447* -0.0497** 
 (0.0213) (0.0219) (0.0228) (0.0230) 
Squad size -0.00769** -0.00780** -0.00760** -0.00764** 
 (0.00333) (0.00335) (0.00341) (0.00341) 
Squad age -0.00641 -0.00254 -0.00652 -0.00254 
 (0.0144) (0.0141) (0.0143) (0.0139) 
Transfer income -0.0367 -0.0330 -0.0395 -0.0382 
 (0.125) (0.126) (0.127) (0.128) 
UEFA prize money   -0.108 -0.203 
   (0.207) (0.190) 
Investor payments 0.0121 0.0116 0.0117 0.0106 
 (0.0165) (0.0164) (0.0168) (0.0166) 
Points per match 0.0690*  0.0693*  
 (0.0413)  (0.0409)  
Points per match * FFP 0.114  0.114  
 (0.0718)  (0.0714)  
Prob(win)  0.457*  0.486** 
  (0.238)  (0.230) 
Prob(win) * FFP  0.443**  0.437** 
  (0.199)  (0.197) 
Season fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Club fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 482 482 482 482 
R-squared 0.625 0.628 0.625 0.629 
Table 6: The dependent variable is the absolute value of transfer payments of a given football club in a 
given league and year relative to the lagged market value of the squad. One observation corresponds to 
one value per club and season. The table is restricted to observations after 2009 and to first league 
observations only. The financial fair play (FFP) dummy is an indicator variable, which is set to one after 
2013 and zero otherwise. Points per match is the average number of points scored in a given season. 
Prob(win) is a team’s share of wins in a given season. Player market value is the average of all players’ 
market values (in m€) of a given club in a given season. Squad size and Squad age are the number and 
the average age of all players in a given squad and season. Transfer income is cash inflows due to player 
transfers relative to the lagged market value of a club’s players. UEFA prize money, taken from official 
UEFA press releases, is the amount of money (in m€) a club is awarded due to its participation and 
success in international tournaments. Investor payments are investor payments to a given club in a given 
season (Section 4). All independent variables are lagged by one period. Huber/White robust standard 
errors clustered by club are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%-, 
5%-, and 10%-levels, respectively. 
6. Summary and Discussion 
In 2010, the UEFA approved new financial fair play (FFP) regulations to improve the financial health 
of European football clubs. In this paper, however, we show that there may be unintended consequences 
of the new FFP regulations. Based on a novel dataset of European football clubs, we find results that are 
consistent with the view that FFP has further amplified competitive imbalance. This is likely because 
FFP may raise some barriers against the entrance of new investors. Accordingly, we present evidence 
that, after the introduction of FFP, former season’s winners are correlated with greater budget shares in 
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the upcoming season. Also, the positive correlation between the presence of football investors and 
competition is lower after the introduction of FFP. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that 
FFP tends to make European football leagues less equilibrated and to freeze current hierarchies. It fits 
into this picture that according to some authors FFP rules may be violating European Union antitrust 
laws (e.g., Kaplan, 2015).  
Thus, our study may have several implications. As competition in European football leagues has 
decreased considerably over the past decade, the UEFA might want to reexamine its FFP regulation. 
Actually, simply withdrawing the FFP rules may not prove helpful, because the financial health of 
European football clubs might quickly deteriorate again. Therefore, the UEFA could both legislate rules 
that foster competition among European football clubs and search for alternative ways of ensuring 
financial stability.  
On the one hand, UEFA’s break-even rule might not be helpful to increase competition as it limits 
certain investor cash flows. Furthermore, UEFA prize money, which is awarded to only a small fraction 
of clubs in a given league, has increased tremendously over the past decade (Figure 2). Thereby, it is 
likely that the current distribution system of prize money has further concentrated current hierarchies in 
and across European football leagues. Therefore, the UEFA might want to consider a different 
distribution mechanism. In this regard, D’Andrea & Masciandaro (2016) also suggests the redistribution 
of revenues or revenue sharing. 
On the other hand, to ensure financial stability even in case the break-even rule might have been 
withdrawn or alleviated, the UEFA could further improve financial oversight and transparency in terms 
of reporting quality. Furthermore, similar to stock companies, football clubs could be well-advised to 
install audit committees that oversee their clubs or to generally improve their governance.   
In light of these developments, national football associations may also be well advised to search for 
alternative ways of maintaining or improving both the attractiveness as well as the international 
competitiveness of their respective leagues. For example, they could look for new ways in order to 
increase the overall value of television rights. Thereby, national football clubs could benefit from 
additional cash inflows, which would make them more competitive internationally. In addition, national 
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rules preventing new investors from entering the scene (as the so called 50+1 rule in Germany) may be 
counterproductive in the light of the results presented in this paper. And finally, it is the duty of the 
clubs’ management to look for additional sources of revenue, for example by entering new markets. It 
fits into this picture that we have seen some of the most prominent European football clubs touring Asia 
or the US. 
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Appendix A: Overview of all investor payments in the dataset 
League Season Club Investment Investors 
Bundesliga 2004/05 FC Bayern München 2.000m€ Adidas 
Bundesliga 2004/05 Bayer 04 Leverkusen 2.500m€ Bayer 
Bundesliga 2004/05 VfL Wolfsburg 7.000m€ Volkswagen 
Bundesliga 2005/06 FC Bayern München 2.000m€ Adidas 
Bundesliga 2005/06 Bayer 04 Leverkusen 2.500m€ Bayer 
Bundesliga 2005/06 VfL Wolfsburg 7.000m€ Volkswagen 
Bundesliga 2005/06 FC Schalke 04 7.750m€ Clemens Tönnies 
Bundesliga 2006/07 FC Bayern München 2.000m€ Adidas 
Bundesliga 2006/07 Bayer 04 Leverkusen 2.500m€ Bayer 
Bundesliga 2006/07 VfL Wolfsburg 7.000m€ Volkswagen 
Bundesliga 2007/08 FC Bayern München 2.000m€ Adidas 
Bundesliga 2007/08 Bayer 04 Leverkusen 2.500m€ Bayer 
Bundesliga 2007/08 VfL Wolfsburg 7.000m€ Volkswagen 
Bundesliga 2008/09 FC Bayern München 2.000m€ Adidas 
Bundesliga 2008/09 Bayer 04 Leverkusen 2.500m€ Bayer 
Bundesliga 2008/09 VfL Wolfsburg 62.500m€ Volkswagen 
Bundesliga 2008/09 TSG 1899 Hoffenheim 41.263m€ Dietmar Hopp 
Bundesliga 2008/09 1. FC Köln 1.000m€ Franz-Joseph Wernze 
Bundesliga 2009/10 FC Bayern München 2.000m€ Adidas 
Bundesliga 2009/10 Bayer 04 Leverkusen 2.500m€ Bayer 
Bundesliga 2009/10 VfL Wolfsburg 67.500m€ Volkswagen 
Bundesliga 2009/10 TSG 1899 Hoffenheim 79.433m€ Dietmar Hopp 
Bundesliga 2009/10 1. FC Köln 1.000m€ Franz-Joseph Wernze 
Bundesliga 2010/11 FC Bayern München 102.000m€ Adidas, Audi 
Bundesliga 2010/11 Bayer 04 Leverkusen 2.500m€ Bayer 
Bundesliga 2010/11 VfL Wolfsburg 67.500m€ Volkswagen 
Bundesliga 2010/11 TSG 1899 Hoffenheim 118.320m€ Dietmar Hopp 
Bundesliga 2010/11 1. FC Köln 0.475m€ Franz-Joseph Wernze 
Bundesliga 2010/11 Hamburger SV 12.500m€ Klaus-Michael Kühne 
Bundesliga 2010/11 Eintracht Frankfurt 2.000m€ Friends of Eintracht Frankfurt AG (4 banks) 
Bundesliga 2011/12 FC Bayern München 32.200m€ Adidas, Audi 
Bundesliga 2011/12 Bayer 04 Leverkusen 2.500m€ Bayer 
Bundesliga 2011/12 VfL Wolfsburg 67.500m€ Volkswagen 
Bundesliga 2011/12 TSG 1899 Hoffenheim -1.716m€ Dietmar Hopp 
Bundesliga 2011/12 1. FC Köln -0.051m€ Franz-Joseph Wernze 
Bundesliga 2012/13 FC Bayern München 32.200m€ Adidas, Audi 
Bundesliga 2012/13 Bayer 04 Leverkusen 2.500m€ Bayer 
Bundesliga 2012/13 VfL Wolfsburg 67.500m€ Volkswagen 
Bundesliga 2012/13 TSG 1899 Hoffenheim 12.740m€ Dietmar Hopp 
Bundesliga 2012/13 Eintracht Frankfurt 1.250m€ Friends of Eintracht Frankfurt AG (4 banks) 
Bundesliga 2012/13 Hamburger SV 8.000m€ Klaus-Michael Kühne 
Bundesliga 2012/13 Hannover 96 12.500m€ Investor group around Martin Kind 
Bundesliga 2012/13 FC Augsburg 1.000m€ Klaus Hofmann 
Bundesliga 2013/14 FC Bayern München 148.200m€ Adidas, Audi, Allianz 
Bundesliga 2013/14 Bayer 04 Leverkusen 25.200m€ Bayer 
Bundesliga 2013/14 VfL Wolfsburg 67.500m€ Volkswagen 
Bundesliga 2013/14 Hertha BSC Berlin 61.200m€ KKR 
Bundesliga 2013/14 Eintracht Braunschweig -2.700m€ Michael Kölmel 
Bundesliga 2014/15 FC Bayern München 36.000m€ Adidas, Audi, Allianz 
Bundesliga 2014/15 Bayer 04 Leverkusen 75.000m€ Bayer 
Bundesliga 2014/15 VfL Wolfsburg 67.500m€ Volkswagen 
Bundesliga 2014/15 Borussia Dortmund 162.994m€ Evonik, Signal Iduna, Puma 
Bundesliga 2014/15 1. FC Köln -1.547m€ Franz-Josef Wernze 
Bundesliga 2014/15 Hamburger SV 17.000m€ Klaus-Michael Kühne 
2. Bundesliga 2005/06 Eintracht Braunschweig -0.200m€ Michael Kölmel 
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2. Bundesliga 2006/07 Eintracht Braunschweig -0.200m€ Michael Kölmel 
2. Bundesliga 2006/07 FC Augsburg 25.000m€ Investor group around Walther Seinsch 
2. Bundesliga 2007/08 TSG 1899 Hoffenheim 63.312m€ Dietmar Hopp 
2. Bundesliga 2011/12 TSV 1860 München 23.860m€ Hasan Ismaik 
2. Bundesliga 2011/12 1. FC Union Berlin -0.400m€ Michael Kölmel 
2. Bundesliga 2011/12 Eintracht Braunschweig -1.000m€ Michael Kölmel 
2. Bundesliga 2011/12 Dynamo Dresden -0.380m€ Michael Kölmel 
2. Bundesliga 2012/13 Eintracht Braunschweig -1.000m€ Michael Kölmel 
2. Bundesliga 2012/13 1. FC Köln -1.565m€ Franz-Josef Wernze 
2. Bundesliga 2012/13 TSV 1860 München 3.500m€ Hasan Ismaik 
2. Bundesliga 2012/13 1. FC Union Berlin -0.700m€ Michael Kölmel 
2. Bundesliga 2012/13 MSV Duisburg 0.600m€ Walter Hellmich 
2. Bundesliga 2012/13 FC Ingolstadt 04 6.500m€ Volkswagen group (Quattro GmbH) 
2. Bundesliga 2012/13 Dynamo Dresden -0.450m€ Michael Kölmel 
2. Bundesliga 2013/14 1. FC Köln -0.620m€ Franz-Josef Wernze 
2. Bundesliga 2013/14 TSV 1860 München 1.200m€ Hasan Ismaik 
2. Bundesliga 2013/14 1. FC Union Berlin -1.000m€ Michael Kölmel 
2. Bundesliga 2013/14 Fortuna Düsseldorf -3.900m€ Michael Kölmel 
2. Bundesliga 2013/14 FC Ingolstadt 04 6.500m€ Volkswagen group (Quattro GmbH) 
2. Bundesliga 2013/14 Dynamo Dresden -0.439m€ Michael Kölmel 
2. Bundesliga 2014/15 FC Ingolstadt 04 3.000m€ Volkswagen group (Quattro GmbH) 
2. Bundesliga 2014/15 RB Leipzig 10.000m€ Red Bull 
2. Bundesliga 2014/15 Eintracht Braunschweig -1.400m€ Michael Kölmel 
2. Bundesliga 2014/15 Fortuna Düsseldorf -0.400m€ Michael Kölmel 
Premier League 2004/05 Chelsea 95.590m€ Roman Arkadjewitsch Abramowitsch 
Premier League 2004/05 Bolton Wanderers 18.009m€ Eddie Davies 
Premier League 2004/05 Aston Villa -0.375m€ Doug Ellis 
Premier League 2004/05 Newcastle United -5.545m€ Hall Family, Shepherd Family 
Premier League 2005/06 Chelsea 168.500m€ Roman Arkadjewitsch Abramowitsch 
Premier League 2005/06 Newcastle United -5.225m€ Hall Family, Shepherd Family 
Premier League 2005/06 Bolton Wanderers 17.409m€ Eddie Davies 
Premier League 2005/06 Aston Villa -0.421m€ Doug Ellis 
Premier League 2006/07 Chelsea 142.150m€ Roman Arkadjewitsch Abramowitsch 
Premier League 2006/07 Liverpool 64.960m€ George Gillett and Tom Hicks 
Premier League 2006/07 Bolton Wanderers 17.409m€ Eddie Davies 
Premier League 2006/07 West Ham United -1.500m€ Eggert Magnusson and Björgolfur Guomundsson 
Premier League 2007/08 Newcastle United 203.000m€ Mike Ashley 
Premier League 2007/08 Bolton Wanderers 16.208m€ Eddie Davies 
Premier League 2008/09 Aston Villa 131.250m€ Randolph Lerner 
Premier League 2008/09 Manchester City 299.650m€ Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan 
Premier League 2008/09 Bolton Wanderers 13.807m€ Eddie Davies 
Premier League 2008/09 Sunderland AFC 77.625m€ Drumaville consortium 
Premier League 2009/10 Tottenham Hotspur 48.000m€ Joe Lewis 
Premier League 2009/10 Manchester City 140.350m€ Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan 
Premier League 2009/10 Aston Villa 2.415m€ Randolph Lerner 
Premier League 2009/10 Birmingham City 17.250m€ Carson Yeung 
Premier League 2009/10 Sunderland AFC 54.050m€ Ellis Short 
Premier League 2009/10 Bolton Wanderers 14.907m€ Eddie Davies 
Premier League 2009/10 West Ham United 39.100m€ David Sullivan and David Gold 
Premier League 2010/11 Chelsea 51.350m€ Roman Arkadjewitsch Abramowitsch 
Premier League 2010/11 Manchester City 347.050m€ Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan 
Premier League 2010/11 Sunderland AFC 3.450m€ Ellis Short 
Premier League 2010/11 Bolton Wanderers 12.708m€ Eddie Davies 
Premier League 2010/11 Blackburn Rovers 24.000m€ Rao Family (V H Group – Venky’s London Ltd.) 
Premier League 2010/11 Blackpool -13.200m€ Owen John Oysten 
Premier League 2010/11 West Ham United 2.300m€ David Sullivan and David Gold 
Premier League 2011/12 Manchester City 112.950m€ Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan 
Premier League 2012/13 Manchester City 46.600m€ Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan 
Premier League 2012/13 Swansea City -0.999m€ Morgan Family and Brian Katzen 
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Premier League 2012/13 Stoke City 4.083m€ Peter Coates (bet365) 
Premier League 2013/14 Manchester City 230.600m€ Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan 
Premier League 2013/14 Stoke City 4.083m€ Peter Coates (bet365) 
Premier League 2014/15 Manchester City 151.975m€ Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan 
Premier League 2014/15 Liverpool 190.000m€ John W. Henry (Fenway Sports Group) 
Premier League 2014/15 Stoke City 4.083m€ Peter Coates (bet365) 
Premier League 2014/15 Leicester City 30.080m€ Srivaddhanaprabha Family 
Championship 2006/07 Stoke City 4.785m€ Peter Coates (bet365) 
Championship 2007/08 Stoke City 8.100m€ Peter Coates (bet365) 
Championship 2007/08 Wolverhampton Wanderers 30.000m€ Steve Morgan 
Championship 2007/08 Queens Park Rangers 18.200m€ Flavio Briatore 
Championship 2007/08 Norwich City 2.900m€ Delia Smith and Michael Wynn-Jones 
Championship 2007/08 Coventry City 12.767m€ Ray Ranson 
Championship  2008/09 Norwich City 2.500m€ Delia Smith and Michael Wynn-Jones 
Championship 2009/10 Blackpool -0.693m€ Owen John Oysten 
Championship 2010/11 Norwich City 2.400m€ Michael Foulger 
Championship 2010/11 Cardiff City 45.339m€ Investor group around Vincent Tan 
Championship  2010/11 Leicester City 8.690m€ Srivaddhanaprabha Family 
Championship 2010/11 Hull City 34.252m€ Allam Family 
Championship 2011/12 Cardiff City 1.001m€ Investor group around Vincent Tan 
Championship 2011/12 Hull City 1.610m€ Allam Family 
Championship 2011/12 Leicester City 21.150m€ Srivaddhanaprabha Family 
Championship 2012/13  Cardiff City 14.425m€ Investor group around Vincent Tan 
Championship 2012/13 Hull City 8.440m€ Allam Family 
Championship 2012/13 Leicester City 9.070m€ Srivaddhanaprabha Family 
Championship 2013/14 Leicester City 3.700m€ Srivaddhanaprabha Family 
Ligue 1 2011/12 Paris Saint-Germain 128.000m€ Qatari ruling family 
Ligue 1 2012/13 Paris Saint-Germain 145.000m€ Qatari ruling family 
Ligue 1 2013/14 Paris Saint-Germain 175.000m€ Qatari ruling family 
Ligue 1 2013/14 AS Monaco 113.850m€ Dmitri Jewgenjewitsch Rybolowlew 
Ligue 1 2014/15 Paris Saint-Germain 195.000m€ Qatari ruling family 
Ligue 2 2012/13 AS Monaco 21.150m€ Dmitri Jewgenjewitsch Rybolowlew 
Serie A 2004/05 US Palermo 12.580m€ Maurizio Zamparini 
Serie A 2005/06 Inter 9.340m€ Massimo Moratti 
Serie A 2005/06 US Palermo 6.600m€ Maurizio Zamparini 
Serie A 2006/07 Inter 10.300m€ Massimo Moratti 
Serie A 2006/07 AC Milan 75.000m€ Berlusconi Family (Fininvest) 
Serie A 2007/08 Juventus 81.875m€ Agnelli Family (Exor) 
Serie A 2007/08 AC Milan 93.000m€ Berlusconi Family (Fininvest) 
Serie A 2007/08 US Palermo 5.070m€ Maurizio Zamparini 
Serie A 2008/09 Inter 95.000m€ Massimo Moratti 
Serie A 2008/09 Juventus 11.000m€ Agnelli Family (Exor) 
Serie A 2008/09 AC Milan 18.000m€ Berlusconi Familiy (Fininvest) 
Serie A 2008/09 US Palermo 9.360m€ Maurizio Zamparini 
Serie A 2009/10 Inter 120.000m€ Massimo Moratti 
Serie A 2009/10 AC Milan 44.000m€ Berlusconi Familiy (Fininvest) 
Serie A 2009/10 Juventus 11.000m€ Agnelli Family (Exor) 
Serie A 2010/11 AC Milan 87.000m€ Berlusconi Familiy (Fininvest) 
Serie A 2011/12 Juventus 80.980m€ Agnelli Family (Exor) 
Serie A 2011/12 AC Milan 29.000m€ Berlusconi Familiy (Fininvest) 
Serie A 2012/13 Juventus 11.667m€ Agnelli Family (Exor) 
Serie A 2012/13 Atalanta 2.250m€ Antonio Percassi 
Serie A 2013/14 Juventus 11.667m€ Agnelli Family (Exor) 
Serie A 2013/14 Inter 200.000m€ Erick Thohir 
Primera División 2008/09 Valencia 50.000m€ Company group Fomento Urbano de Castellon 
Primera División 2010/11 Málaga 75.050m€ Sheikh Abdullah Al Thani 
Primera División 2011/12 Málaga 59.250m€ Sheikh Abdullah Al Thani 
Primera División 2014/15 Atlético Madrid 30.000m€ Wang Jianlin 
Primera División 2014/15 Valencia 60.000m€ Peter Lim 
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Appendix B: Robustness tests 
 (Ia) (Ib) (IIa) (IIb) (IIc) (IId) (IIIa) (IIIb) (IVa) (IVb) 
Dep. variable Theil 
index 
C5ICB Theil 
index 
C5ICB Theil 
index 
C5ICB Theil 
index 
C5ICB Theil 
index 
C5ICB 
Top4 league   0.644 -1.180 0.661 -1.127 -0.324 -1.858 -0.163 -1.342 
   (0.744) (3.245) (0.675) (2.931) (0.263) (1.378) (0.571) (2.750) 
Market value heterogeneity     -0.844 -0.743 -0.808 -0.924 -1.862 -0.229 -1.968* -1.236 
   (0.488) (1.857) (0.561) (1.932) (1.083) (3.721) (1.043) (5.205) 
Positive cash inflow   -0.0554 35.03** -0.595 36.56** 3.912 16.85 2.970 28.01** 
   (2.155) (10.92) (2.001) (13.23) (3.909) (9.351) (3.652) (11.88) 
First League * FFP -2.789** -7.495* -1.345* -9.360** -1.408* -9.036*     
 (1.096) (3.482) (0.727) (3.774) (0.690) (4.074)     
Foreign test games   1.393 -5.511       
   (3.126) (17.82)       
SD(Foreign test games)     0.423 -0.519     
     (0.378) (2.466)     
First League * Placebo       -0.727 -0.298 -0.296 -3.541 
       (0.890) (4.415) (1.339) (6.697) 
Season fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
League fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 110 110 50 50 50 50 60 60 50 50 
R² 0.867 0.654 0.969 0.737 0.969 0.736 0.911 0.690 0.920 0.734 
The dependent variables are different measures of competition in European football leagues (Section 4). One observation corresponds to one league in a given 
year. In Models II, the table is restricted to observations after 2009. In Models III (IV), the sample is restricted to observations before 2011 (2010). The financial 
fair play (FFP) dummy is an indicator variable, which is set to one after 2013 and zero otherwise. First League is a dummy set to one for the highest football 
leagues and zero otherwise. Top4 league is a dummy variable which is set to one if a league’s underlying national team was among the four best teams at the 
preceding world or European championships, and zero otherwise. Market value heterogeneity is the standard deviation of the clubs’ average player market values 
in a given league and season (in m€). Positive cash inflow denotes the fraction of clubs with at least one investor with an overall positive cash contribution to the 
club. Foreign test games reflects the share of football clubs in a given league and season that performed test games against teams from other countries. SD(Foreign 
test games) is the standard deviation of the number of test games against foreign teams before the start of the season, calculated per league and season. Models III 
perform placebo tests. The Placebo dummy is set to one after 2009 (2008) in Model III (IV), and zero otherwise. Huber/White robust standard errors clustered by 
football league are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-levels, respectively. 
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Appendix C: Further robustness tests 
 (Ia) (Ib) (IIa) (IIb) (IIIa) (IIIb) (IVa) (IVb) 
Dep. variable Theil index C5ICB Theil index C5ICB Theil index C5ICB Theil index C5ICB 
Top4 league 0.956 1.174 0.966 1.007 1.049 1.055 0.993 0.982 
 (1.039) (0.791) (0.923) (0.936) (1.068) (0.918) (0.895) (0.914) 
Market value heterogeneity   -1.237 -0.277 -1.196* -1.061 -1.152 -0.272 -1.193* -0.996 
 (1.334) (1.179) (0.643) (0.617) (1.193) (1.171) (0.625) (0.565) 
Positive cash inflow 12.31*  -0.880  13.65**  -0.561  
 (5.546)  (2.488)  (5.546)  (2.592)  
Cash flow heterogeneity  0.0484*  -0.000444  0.0511*  0.00314 
  (0.0221)  (0.0105)  (0.0231)  (0.0134) 
Positive cash inflow * FFP -1.680  -0.826      
 (2.216)  (1.435)      
Cash flow heterogeneity * FFP  -0.0722*  -0.0193     
  (0.0388)  (0.0187)     
Positive cash inflow * FFP (2012)     -3.386  -1.203  
     (2.131)  (1.494)  
Cash flow heterogeneity * FFP (2012)      -0.0780*  -0.0258 
      (0.0412)  (0.0219) 
Season fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
League fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
R² 0.742 0.743 0.961 0.963 0.750 0.746 0.961 0.964 
The dependent variables are different measures of competition in European football leagues (Section 4). One observation corresponds to one league in a given 
year. The table is restricted to observations after 2009. The financial fair play (FFP) dummy is an indicator variable, which is set to one after 2013 and zero 
otherwise. Alternatively, we also set the variable to one after 2012 only (Models III and IV). Top4 league is a dummy variable which is set to one if a league’s 
underlying national team was among the four best teams at the preceding world or European championships, and zero otherwise. Market value heterogeneity is the 
standard deviation of the clubs’ average player market values in a given league and season (in m€). Positive cash inflow denotes the fraction of clubs with at least 
one investor with an overall positive cash contribution to the club. Cash flow heterogeneity is the standard deviation of investor cash flows in a given league and 
season (in m€). Huber/White robust standard errors clustered by football league are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%-, 5%-
, and 10%-levels, respectively. 
